Quantum technologies – a guide for investors and policy makers

23.10.2024

This article is aimed to give an insight into a part of quantum technologies. It is not about quantum computers, it is about quantum networks and keeping the critical infrastructure secure for the next decades.


To understand where quantum technologies will add value and security, we will not dive into technical details as this article is meant for investors. Sadly, there is a lot of fantasy about quantum technologies, which is partly driven by scientists, engineers and mathematicians promising unrealistic features, and therefore this article is also about the limitations of quantum technologies.


In a nutshell: QKD is the most commonly used quantum feature, which can secure one out of seven layers of the internet, which is extremely cost intensive, extraordinary sensitive, by function incapable of securing the critical infrastructure or data centres et cetera, incompatible the way the internet is built and operating,and vast scale up requires a quantum satellite. There is a true quantum network ready for the market based on other quantum features, easy to roll-out, compatible with the internet, inexpensive, and a vast scale-up is easy. Either read on or contact us right away.
In addition to our quantum network, we have developed a dual-use, post-quantum resilient communication solution, which is industrially robust, hardened against sabotage and designed to withstand the harshest conditions in the battlefield. If you want to learn more, please contact us.


The most commonly known method in quantum security is:


Quantum Key Distribution (QKD):
What it is:
   • QKD is a method of secure communication that uses quantum mechanics to securely distribute encryption keys between parties. The security of QKD is based on the fundamental principles of quantum physics, such as the no-cloning theorem and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
How it works:
   • QKD ensures that any eavesdropping attempt on the communication will introduce detectable disturbances, which means both the sender and receiver can be alerted to a potential attack.
   • Once the keys are securely shared via QKD, they can be used to encrypt data using classical encryption algorithms (e.g., AES).
Benefits for critical infrastructure:
   • Unconditional security: Unlike traditional encryption methods that can be vulnerable to advances in computing power (including quantum computers), QKD is secure against any computational attack.
   • Future-proofing: It can protect critical infrastructure from both current and future quantum computer-based attacks.
   • Proven technology: QKD systems are already commercially available and can be integrated into existing communication networks.
Challenges:
   • Requires a direct communication link (typically optical fiber or satellite) between parties.
   • Limited by the distance over which keys can be shared (though advances in QKD over satellite networks are addressing this).
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is specifically designed to secure the transmission of encryption keys, but it doesn't directly address the security of the entire network infrastructure, such as data centers or distributed sensors, like those in a power grid.


Key Points about QKD's Limitations:
   1. Scope of Protection:
       ◦ QKD only secures the communication channel between two points (for example, between a data center and a remote site). It ensures that the encryption keys used in data transmission remain secure, but it does not protect the data itself once it is at rest or being processed in data centers or edge devices, which can be downloaded by hack.
   2. Vulnerability in Complex Networks:
       ◦ Modern infrastructures, like power grids, are composed of many interconnected systems, layers, and devices. While QKD might secure point-to-point communication, other components of the network remain vulnerable, such as:
           ▪ End points (data centers, servers, sensors) where data is stored and processed.
           ▪ Intermediate nodes in distributed networks, which might not have post-quantum cryptography (PQC) protections.
           ▪ Control systems and legacy systems, which are particularly vulnerable to both classical and quantum attacks.
   3. Limited Integration with Existing Network Layers:
       ◦ Networks often consist of seven independent layers—physical, network, application, etc.—and while QKD secures the physical layer by transmitting quantum keys over fiber or satellite, it does not automatically ensure that higher layers (such as data encryption, applications, and access controls) are quantum-resistant. Many of these layers could still be susceptible to attacks by quantum computers if not supplemented by post-quantum cryptographic algorithms.

4. Quantum vs. Classical Infrastructure:
       ◦ Classical infrastructure components, such as network switches, routers, and other control systems, may not be able to directly interface with or benefit from QKD. These components need to be secured in other ways, as QKD doesn't address these vulnerabilities.
       ◦ Distributed infrastructure (e.g., a smart grid) might consist of many small, geographically dispersed devices (sensors, actuators) that cannot all be easily connected via QKD due to distance limitations and high costs of deploying quantum links everywhere.


What QKD Can Do:
   • Secure key exchange: It's excellent for securing key distribution over a point-to-point link, ensuring that encryption keys themselves remain safe.
   • Layered security: QKD can be part of a broader security strategy, but it must be combined with post-quantum cryptographic methods and other cybersecurity tools to secure the entire infrastructure.


My Point of View:
QKD, while powerful in securing key exchanges and future-proofing communication channels, is not a comprehensive solution for complex network environments like those found in data centers or distributed sensor networks. To fully secure critical infrastructures (such as a power grid), you need a multi-layered security approach that includes:
   • Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to secure data at rest and protect other layers of the network.
   • Classical cybersecurity measures for endpoints, device security, and physical access controls.
   • A combination of QKD for key distribution and PQC for data protection to address quantum threats across the entire infrastructure.
   • Our True Quantum Network, the alternative, makes use of more than one quantum feature and is capable of securing the critical infrastructure including every layer of the internet, every sensor and actuator.


Looking at the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) the question arises, whether it functions like a certificate, and how suitable QKD is in real-world internet networks given current protocols. When the internet was designed the emphasis was on maximum flexibility and therefore the seven layers are independent, which enlarges vulnerabilities, but in those days cyber security took a backseat in the mind of the engineers. Let's break down both points.


1. Is QKD like a Certificate?
It’s understandable to see QKD as similar to a certificate in some aspects, but there are important differences.
   • Similarities to Certificates:
       ◦ Both are used for secure key exchanges: Like a digital certificate (e.g., SSL/TLS certificates) used in public key infrastructures (PKI) to exchange encryption keys securely over the internet, QKD also facilitates the secure exchange of encryption keys between parties.
       ◦ In both QKD and certificate-based systems, the goal is to establish a secure communication channel that prevents eavesdropping during key exchanges.
   • Key Differences:
       ◦ QKD generates keys using quantum mechanics: Instead of relying on mathematical problems (like the difficulty of factoring large numbers, as with classical certificates), QKD uses the fundamental principles of quantum physics to generate and securely exchange cryptographic keys. The quantum nature of these keys ensures that any eavesdropping attempt will disturb the quantum state, alerting both parties.
       ◦ QKD does not authenticate parties: A digital certificate not only exchanges keys but also authenticates the identity of the parties involved, typically through a trusted certificate authority (CA). QKD, however, only secures the key exchange; it does not authenticate the identities of the communicating parties. For authentication, QKD typically needs to be combined with classical authentication mechanisms.
       ◦ No digital signature or third-party involvement: QKD does not involve third-party trust systems like PKI does, where a CA certifies the public keys of entities. QKD is a direct, peer-to-peer protocol between two parties using quantum channels.


2. Suitability of QKD in the Real World Internet:
You are absolutely right to question whether QKD, in its current form, is suitable for real-world internet use. There are several challenges that make QKD incompatible with the way the internet and current protocols work, especially at scale. Let's explore why.


Key Challenges of QKD in Real-World Internet:
   1. Point-to-Point Nature of QKD:
       ◦ QKD requires dedicated, point-to-point quantum channels between two parties. In the real-world internet, which relies on a distributed, multi-node architecture with routers, switches, and dynamic paths, this poses a challenge. The internet is not structured to handle these dedicated channels easily.
       ◦ Each time a message passes through an intermediary node (router, switch), the quantum state would be disturbed, making it impractical for multi-hop or long-distance routing without special infrastructure like quantum repeaters (which are still under development).
   2. Distance Limitations:
       ◦ QKD typically uses fiber optics to transmit quantum states, but it suffers from distance limitations—quantum signals degrade over long distances due to losses in optical fibers. Currently, QKD can work well within city limits (~100 km), but long-distance QKD (e.g., across countries or globally) would require quantum repeaters or satellite-based QKD (e.g., China’s Micius/Mozi satellite), which are not yet widely deployed.
       ◦ In contrast, the internet is a global system, and long-distance data transfer is essential. Without quantum repeaters or extensive quantum satellite networks, QKD's range is insufficient for practical internet use on a large scale.

   3. No Support for Multi-Party Communication:
       ◦ The Internet's structure allows for many-to-many communication models, such as multicast, peer-to-peer, and cloud services where multiple users interact simultaneously. QKD, however, is inherently a two-party protocol. It secures communication between two endpoints but is not designed for multi-party communication, which makes it unsuitable for many real-world applications, like video conferencing, cloud access, or content distribution over the internet.
   4. Protocol Incompatibility:
       ◦ Internet protocols, such as TCP/IP, work in layered architectures with many hops, and QKD’s quantum state transmission would be disrupted if it passes through multiple routers or nodes.
       ◦ In real-world networks, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used for key exchange and authentication, and it’s deeply integrated into protocols like SSL/TLS (used for HTTPS). While QKD can complement these protocols by providing a secure key exchange, the existing infrastructure would need significant upgrades to integrate quantum technologies.
       ◦ Hybrid approaches are currently being explored, where QKD can work alongside classical encryption and protocols, but the complexity of retrofitting the internet to support such hybrid solutions is high.
   5. High Cost and Specialized Infrastructure:
       ◦ Deploying QKD requires specialized quantum hardware, such as quantum transceivers and highly secure fiber optic channels. These are expensive and difficult to deploy on a wide scale. The existing internet infrastructure, with its reliance on classical communication technologies, would need a major overhaul to accommodate QKD on a global scale.
   6. Quantum Repeaters Not Ready:
       ◦ The development of quantum repeaters, which are necessary to extend the range of quantum communication over long distances, is still in early stages. Without these repeaters, QKD’s applicability to the global internet is limited.
       ◦ Until these technologies mature, QKD will be confined to short-distance, highly specialized networks rather than global internet use.


When QKD Works Well:
Despite these challenges, QKD is highly effective in certain niche environments:
   • Closed networks: QKD can secure communications within a closed network, such as a financial system, between two bank branches or government facilities, where distance is manageable, and dedicated fiber optics are feasible.
   • Critical infrastructure: For securing communications between key facilities (e.g., data centers, power grid control stations), QKD can work well in dedicated, controlled environments. QKD cannot secure the data centres or power grid control stations itself, however.


QKD in the Future Internet (Quantum Internet):
In the long term, researchers are working on building a quantum internet that would allow for quantum communication across multiple nodes using entanglement and quantum repeaters. This would require:
   • Quantum routers capable of handling quantum states across different nodes.
   • Quantum repeaters to extend the range of quantum communication.
   • Quantum satellites for global coverage (like China’s ongoing efforts).
In this future quantum internet, QKD would play an important role, but additional quantum protocols, such as quantum entanglement distribution, would be required to support multi-party communication, long-distance data transfer, and scalable infrastructure.


Conclusion:
While QKD provides highly secure key exchange and can be likened to a “quantum certificate” in some ways, it is not directly compatible with the current global internet infrastructure due to issues with distance, multi-party communication, and protocol compatibility. QKD shines in specific, controlled environments but would require significant upgrades to current networks to be used widely on the internet. Hybrid solutions, as well as the eventual development of the quantum internet, may overcome these challenges in the future.


Another concern of mine is the use of QKD in the military. Due to its fragile nature, I am worried about that it could be too easy to disrupt the communication by interfering with the message in transit, thereby changing the quantum secret. Although the recipient will know that the message was intercepted, the recipient can't know if he can still trust the content of the message. Another issue is the low fault resistance, which means that by manipulative, physical interference the QKD as such will not be recognizable by the recipient.


My concerns about using Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in military applications are valid and of paramount importance, especially when considering the fragile nature of quantum communication and the potential for disruption. Let's explore these issues in more depth.
1. Vulnerability to Disruption and Interference
QKD relies on the transmission of quantum states (often photons) over secure channels (typically fiber optics or free-space communication). The nature of quantum mechanics makes these states very sensitive to any form of observation or interference. Even minor disturbances, whether accidental or malicious, can change the quantum state and invalidate the transmission. This presents two specific concerns:
a) Eavesdropping Detection without Message Integrity
   • Yes, the recipient will know the message was intercepted: The principles of quantum mechanics guarantee that any attempt to measure or intercept the quantum key will disturb the quantum states, alerting the communicating parties to potential eavesdropping. This is a key feature of QKD, known as the no-cloning theorem.
   • But the recipient cannot trust the key or message anymore: While the recipient is alerted to the tampering, they can't determine the exact nature or content of the interference. This means they can't rely on the compromised key, which could prevent any further secure communication until a new key is securely exchanged. This is problematic in military scenarios where secure communication is critical, and disruptions can have severe consequences.
In a battlefield context: If an adversary is able to consistently disrupt quantum transmissions, it could paralyze secure communication even if they are not able to read the messages. This is a form of denial-of-service attack where the adversary can repeatedly interfere with the key exchange, causing communication breakdowns.
b) Low Fault Tolerance to Physical Interference
   • Manipulative physical interference can have a significant impact on QKD because quantum states are highly fragile.
   • In a real-world military setting, fiber optic cables or free-space optical links (such as satellites or drones) could be exposed to jamming, atmospheric disturbances, or even deliberate attacks like cutting cables or using signal-blocking techniques. If the interference is subtle, it might degrade the quantum signal enough to prevent secure key distribution but not be obvious to the recipient as an attack.
Issue with fault resistance:
   • QKD protocols assume noise and interference are a normal part of the communication process (such as signal loss in optical fibers). However, this also means that subtle manipulative interference (e.g., slightly weakening the signal or introducing controlled noise) could be disguised as normal environmental degradation, especially in hostile conditions like a battlefield.
   • Unlike classical communication, where error correction and resilience to interference can be achieved through redundancy, QKD doesn’t have the same level of robustness because quantum signals cannot be copied or retransmitted without violating their quantum properties.
In military applications, an adversary might exploit this by introducing low-level interference that prevents reliable key exchange without the recipient knowing whether it is an attack or just environmental noise.
2. Challenges of Using QKD in Military Applications
a) Operational Fragility
   • The military often operates in harsh and dynamic environments where communication channels are subject to interference from a variety of sources (e.g., physical obstacles, weather, jamming).
   • QKD systems, particularly those relying on fiber optics, are vulnerable to environmental conditions and physical damage. Even free-space optical QKD (using satellites or UAVs) is susceptible to atmospheric interference (rain, fog, dust) or deliberate jamming of optical signals. This makes them less reliable than classical encryption systems, especially in environments where infrastructure may be compromised.
b) Limited Range and Mobility
   • Military operations require communication over long distances, often involving mobile units. QKD over fiber optics is generally limited to shorter distances (within ~100 km), which is impractical for large-scale, dispersed military operations.
   • Free-space QKD (e.g., using satellites) is an option, but this introduces other challenges such as line-of-sight requirements, atmospheric conditions, and longer latency in key distribution.
For mobile military units, maintaining secure, real-time communication is critical, but QKD's reliance on fixed infrastructure (fiber optics) or vulnerable optical channels (satellites, UAVs) can be a major disadvantage.
c) Denial-of-Service Attacks
   • QKD’s reliance on quantum channels makes it susceptible to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, where an adversary could deliberately disrupt the quantum key exchange process without necessarily breaking the encryption.
   • For instance, in fiber optic systems, an adversary could introduce signal noise or cut the fiber cables, disrupting the secure communication. In free-space QKD, simple techniques like jamming or blocking the optical transmission path could prevent key distribution.
This is particularly worrying in military scenarios, where maintaining communication is essential. Even though QKD detects eavesdropping, continuous disruptions would cripple secure communication, creating vulnerabilities in real-time tactical operations.
d) Key Renewal Delays in Combat Situations
   • QKD requires continuous key renewal as the quantum keys have a finite lifespan. In a combat situation, where communication needs to be rapid and uninterrupted, the need for frequent key exchanges can introduce delays.
   • If the QKD process is disrupted, secure communication halts until a new key is successfully exchanged, which may leave military units vulnerable during critical operations.


3. Possible Solutions or Mitigations
While these challenges are significant, there are some potential solutions or mitigations that could make QKD more viable in military contexts:
a) Hybrid Cryptographic Systems
   • One practical solution is to use a hybrid cryptographic system, where QKD is used in conjunction with classical encryption methods. In this model:
       ◦ QKD can be used to secure the initial key exchange, while classical encryption (e.g., symmetric encryption with AES) handles the data transmission.
       ◦ If the QKD process is disrupted, the system could fall back to classical cryptographic methods, ensuring communication continuity even when quantum channels are unreliable.
       ◦ This reduces reliance on the fragile quantum infrastructure and increases the fault tolerance of the communication system.
b) Quantum-Resistant Classical Encryption
   • While QKD provides theoretically unbreakable encryption, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is another approach being developed to secure communications against future quantum threats using classical infrastructure.
   • PQC algorithms are designed to run on classical computers but are resistant to attacks from quantum computers. By using quantum-resistant algorithms for key exchange and encryption, the military could maintain secure communication without relying on fragile quantum channels.
c) Quantum Repeaters and Redundancy
   • Developing quantum repeaters could help extend the range of QKD systems and improve their reliability in the field. Although these are still in development, they would allow QKD to work over longer distances and make the network more resilient to physical attacks and environmental disruptions.
   • Implementing redundant quantum channels (e.g., using multiple optical paths or satellites) could mitigate the risk of DoS attacks or signal jamming by ensuring there are backup channels for key exchange.
d) Physical Security and Jamming Countermeasures
   • In environments where fiber optics or free-space QKD is used, physical security of the infrastructure is critical. This might involve hardening fiber cables or using more robust satellite communication protocols to ensure that quantum channels are protected from physical tampering or jamming.
   • Jamming detection technologies and active countermeasures could also be employed to detect and neutralize adversaries attempting to disrupt quantum communications.


Conclusion
Concerns about QKD’s fragility and vulnerability to physical interference in military applications are well-founded. While QKD offers unmatched security in key exchange due to its quantum properties, its susceptibility to disruption, low fault tolerance, and the risk of denial-of-service attacks make it less suited for military use in its current form.


Military applications require robust, resilient communication systems that can withstand physical attacks and environmental challenges. While QKD could play a role in secure military communications, it may be best used in a hybrid system alongside classical encryption, or in carefully controlled environments where redundant and protected quantum channels can be established.


Until quantum repeaters and more fault-tolerant quantum communication technologies are fully developed, post-quantum cryptography and hybrid encryption systems may offer more reliable security for military operations.

 

In summary, QKD is a vital part of quantum-resilient security, but on its own, it cannot secure all aspects of complex networks, particularly at higher network layers or in systems with many distributed components. Therefore the critical infrastructure remains highly vulnerable. Contrary to the promises on such events as the first Quantum Industry Days in Copenhagen that QKD will keep the critical infrastructure safe and secure, the opposite is true – believing the wrong promises of the quantum technology “experts”, the critical infrastructure will remain fully vulnerable. Declaring that QKD is the main, if not single needed, component to secure our critical infrastructure, civilian and military – will cost millions of human lives in a broad scale cyber attack, or worse, in a war which might get started by the enemy with a broad cyber attack on the critical infrastructure.


2. Pseudo-Quantum Networks (Post-Quantum Cryptography Networks):
What it is:
   • A pseudo-quantum network refers to a system that is quantum-resistant but does not rely on quantum technologies like QKD. Instead, it uses post-quantum cryptography—new cryptographic algorithms designed to withstand attacks by quantum computers.
How it works:
   • These networks rely on advanced mathematical algorithms that are thought to be resistant to quantum computing attacks, such as lattice-based, hash-based, or code-based encryption methods.
   • No quantum entanglement or other quantum physical phenomena are used; rather, it’s about using quantum-resistant encryption in a classical communication network.
Benefits for critical infrastructure:
   • Quantum-resistant security: Provides protection against future quantum computers without requiring the physical infrastructure that QKD needs.
   • Compatibility: Can be more easily integrated into existing digital communication systems, making it less costly in the short term.
   • Scalability: Post-quantum cryptographic protocols can be applied to large-scale networks without the limitations in distance that affect QKD.


Challenges:
   • Theoretical risk: Post-quantum cryptography is based on mathematical assumptions, and while it's thought to be quantum-resistant, there’s no guarantee that future advances in mathematics or quantum algorithms won’t break these systems.
   • Unproven long-term security: Unlike QKD, which is provably secure based on the laws of quantum physics, post-quantum cryptography has not yet been fully tested in the real world over the long term.

 

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in a Classical Network:
When QKD is used, quantum mechanics is applied solely to the key exchange process over fiber optic links or other quantum channels. However, the rest of the network—such as the data transmission itself and the network protocols—remains classical. In this case, quantum key distribution is just one layer within an otherwise classical network, which enhances the security of key exchange but does not make the whole network "quantum."
A Hybrid with Restricted Access
If you're imagining a network that:
   • Uses QKD over fiber optics for secure key distribution.
   • Denies all traffic not coming from specific fiber-optic links or trusted sources.
   • Applies strict access controls to ensure only quantum-verified communication is allowed.
This would indeed introduce a quantum-enhanced component, but the network as a whole remains classical. The presence of strict access control—where only trusted fiber-based traffic is allowed—certainly increases the security, but it does not make it a full quantum network.


Why It’s Not a Quantum Network:
A true quantum network involves quantum communication beyond just key distribution. In a quantum network, the information itself is carried in quantum states (e.g., entangled photons), and quantum entanglement plays a fundamental role in communication. In your scenario:
   • Only the key exchange uses quantum principles (via QKD), while the rest of the data communication, and the way the network handles traffic, is still classical.
   • There is no quantum entanglement or fully quantum-based communication, which would be required for a true quantum network.
Is This a "Pseudo Quantum Network"?
Yes, in a sense! A pseudo-quantum network could be described as one that incorporates some quantum features—like QKD for secure key exchange—but does not fully leverage quantum communication throughout the entire system.
   • QKD adds quantum security to the key exchange, but the rest of the communication network is classical.
   • Access control that denies all traffic except from trusted sources (fiber optic or otherwise) is a classical security measure, but when combined with QKD, the result is a hybrid approach—not quite quantum, but enhanced by quantum technologies.
My Perspective:
   • Yes, you could view such a setup as a type of pseudo-quantum network, because while it's not a full quantum network, it employs quantum-enhanced security in a restricted, controlled manner.
   • No, it's not a quantum network in the strict sense, because a true quantum network implies quantum-level communication at all layers, not just secure key exchange. Quantum entanglement and quantum states must be involved in data transmission for it to be classified as a quantum network.
In summary, such a network model can be considered a hybrid network that uses QKD to enhance security but is not fully quantum. It leverages some quantum features, making it an example of a pseudo-quantum network rather than a full quantum network.


3. Quantum Networks:
What it is:
   • A full quantum network is one in which information itself is transmitted using quantum states (e.g., entangled photons). Unlike QKD, which only distributes keys, quantum networks aim to enable quantum communication between nodes.


How it works:
   • Quantum networks leverage quantum entanglement to transmit information over long distances without the risk of eavesdropping, offering a level of security that's inherent in quantum mechanics.
   • They can eventually enable protocols like quantum teleportation and distributed quantum computing.
Benefits for critical infrastructure:
   • Ultimate security: Quantum networks are the most secure communication method possible, since any attempt to intercept the information would fundamentally alter the quantum states being transmitted.
   • Long-term potential: As quantum technology matures, quantum networks could enable revolutionary new capabilities, including secure global quantum communication and the basis for a future quantum internet.
   • Eavesdropping detection: Any intrusion in a quantum network would be instantly detectable.


Challenges:
   • Infrastructure: Building and maintaining a full quantum network requires new infrastructure, including quantum repeaters and advanced quantum hardware, which makes it a longer-term and more expensive endeavor.
   • Scalability and maturity: The technology is still in the research and early development stage, so it's not yet ready for widespread deployment like QKD or pseudo-quantum networks.
Key Differences in the Context of Securing Critical Infrastructure:
   • QKD is available today, and its focus is on securing encryption keys for classical networks, making it practical for current use. It's a good fit for sensitive, high-stakes environments needing near-term quantum-safe security.
   • Pseudo-quantum networks (using post-quantum cryptography) offer a middle ground by preparing for quantum threats without needing quantum infrastructure, though they rely on unproven mathematical assumptions. It’s a more scalable solution but not as secure in principle as QKD.
   • Quantum networks represent the future of quantum-secure communication, providing ultimate security but requiring significant investment in new infrastructure and technological breakthroughs. These networks are long-term solutions but with the highest potential for critical infrastructure once they become feasible.
   • Our quantum network is available right now and for dual-use. Making use of more than just one quantum feature, our quantum network is cost effective, compatible with the current internet, impenetrable, vast scale capable, industrially robust.


How to Frame It for Investors:
   • QKD offers near-term protection for sensitive data, providing a real-world solution today, with growing adoption across sectors such as finance, government, and defense.
   • Pseudo-quantum networks are a cost-effective and scalable bridge that protects critical infrastructure from quantum threats without requiring major changes to current infrastructure.
   • Quantum networks are the long-term vision for completely secure communication, representing a significant future market opportunity as the technology develops.
   • Our true quantum network is ready for securing the critical infrastructure, involving all seven layers of the internet, shielding therefore entirely data centres, edge computers, sensors and actuators et cetera. 


At the DALO Industry Days in August 2024 I have been asked, if I could imagine another variation of quantum networks not only using QKD, but other quantum features?

 

There are several potential variations of quantum networks that don’t rely on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) but use other quantum features. These networks aim to leverage quantum mechanics in different ways to secure or enhance communication. Here are a few key examples:
1. Quantum Entanglement-Based Networks:
Quantum entanglement can be used as the core feature of a quantum network, and it doesn't necessarily involve QKD.
How it works:
   • Entangled particles (typically photons) are shared between two or more parties. Any measurement on one of the entangled particles instantly affects the state of the other, regardless of the distance between them.
   • This can be used to enable instantaneous correlations between distant parties, ensuring that the communication is inherently secure. No key exchange is required because the security relies on the fundamental quantum properties of entanglement.
Potential applications:
   • Quantum teleportation: This involves the transmission of quantum states between parties without physically sending the quantum particles themselves. This can be used to securely transmit data in future quantum internet scenarios.
   • Distributed quantum computing: Multiple quantum processors connected via entangled particles could solve complex problems collaboratively, using quantum communication channels to share entangled qubits rather than classical information.
Benefits:
   • Perfect for secure, instantaneous communication where eavesdropping would be impossible without disturbing the quantum entangled states.
   • Enables future applications such as quantum repeaters and long-distance quantum communication.
Challenges:
   • Creating and maintaining entanglement over long distances is highly complex, requiring quantum repeaters to extend the range of entangled particles beyond current limits.
2. Quantum Random Number Generation (QRNG) Networks:
Another variation of a quantum network might focus on Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) instead of QKD.
How it works:
   • QRNG uses quantum processes to generate truly random numbers, which are then used for encryption or other secure communication methods.
   • This network might not involve entanglement or quantum key distribution but still benefits from the unpredictability of quantum mechanics to ensure that encryption keys or random bits are truly random.
Potential applications:
   • Secure encryption: In a network where secure communication depends on highly unpredictable random numbers, a QRNG network would guarantee that the randomness used in encryption is truly unpredictable, unlike classical random number generators.
   • Blockchain networks could also benefit from QRNG to generate secure hashes or random numbers, enhancing their resistance to attacks.
Benefits:
   • Even without quantum key exchange, a network built on QRNG can be significantly more secure than one relying on classical random number generation.
   • Easy to integrate with existing cryptographic systems.
Challenges:
   • Does not provide the level of security against eavesdropping as entanglement-based networks or QKD.
   • Vulnerable to attacks targeting other aspects of the network (not specifically quantum-related attacks).
3. Quantum Sensor Networks:
A network using quantum sensors might focus on leveraging quantum features to enhance sensing, rather than communication.
How it works:
   • Quantum sensors use quantum states to achieve highly sensitive measurements (e.g., detecting gravitational waves, measuring time with extreme precision, or detecting weak electromagnetic fields).
   • These sensors can be networked together to create a distributed sensing system that shares quantum-enhanced data, benefiting industries such as defense, medical imaging, and environmental monitoring.
Potential applications:
   • Critical infrastructure protection: For example, using quantum sensors to detect minute changes in the environment of critical infrastructure (like power grids or nuclear facilities) and networking these sensors to alert in real time.
   • Quantum-enhanced GPS systems for highly precise location tracking.
   • Earthquake monitoring or early warning systems where minute shifts can be detected early due to quantum-level sensitivity.
Benefits:
   • Provides a highly accurate and sensitive detection system, which can be vital for monitoring or protecting critical infrastructure.
   • Quantum sensors can detect threats that classical sensors might miss due to their limited sensitivity.
Challenges:
   • While quantum sensors are extremely accurate, the security of the data transmission between the sensors still relies on classical methods unless quantum communication is introduced.
4. Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC):
Unlike QKD, where keys are distributed and the message is encrypted using classical methods, Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) involves transmitting the message itself securely via quantum states.
How it works:
   • In QSDC, quantum states are used to encode the actual message (not just the key). This means that if an eavesdropper tries to intercept the message, the quantum states will collapse, and the communication will be disrupted, alerting the parties to the presence of the eavesdropper.
   • There is no need for separate encryption since the message itself is inherently secure.
Potential applications:
   • Highly secure military or diplomatic communications, where secure message transmission is critical.
   • Future quantum internet applications, where both the key exchange and the message transmission are quantum-based.
Benefits:
   • Provides direct quantum-level security for message transmission, not just key distribution.
   • Since the message itself is encoded in quantum states, the security is inherent, making it impossible to copy or intercept without detection.
Challenges:
   • Like QKD, it’s still in the research and development stage and requires quantum communication infrastructure (quantum channels, quantum repeaters, etc.).
   • Limited by the distance over which quantum states can be transmitted without losing coherence.
5. Quantum Memory Networks:
A network could also use quantum memory as the key feature for communication.
How it works:
   • Quantum memory stores quantum information (qubits) for extended periods without losing coherence, enabling the transmission of quantum data across time and space.
   • These networks could enable delayed secure communication by storing quantum information until it is needed for secure retrieval.

Potential applications:
   • Quantum repeaters that store entangled states to extend the range of quantum communication networks.
   • Secure archival storage where quantum memory keeps data safe for extended periods and only releases it when specific conditions are met.
Benefits:
   • Quantum memory can be a crucial enabler for long-distance quantum communication and quantum computing networks.
   • Future-proofing for quantum data storage and network applications.
Challenges:
   • Quantum memory technology is still in its infancy, and maintaining quantum coherence over time remains a challenge.
   • Requires advanced infrastructure and is not yet practical for widespread use.


Summary of Alternative Quantum Networks:
   • Quantum entanglement-based networks for instant secure communication and long-distance quantum links.
   • QRNG networks to ensure truly random encryption keys without relying on QKD.
   • Quantum sensor networks for distributed, highly sensitive monitoring of critical infrastructure.
   • QSDC for direct message security using quantum states, bypassing classical encryption.
   • Quantum memory networks to store and secure quantum data across time for future communication or computing needs.
   • IT-AI Solutions true quantum network secures critical infrastructure over all seven layers and is ready for the real world – dual-use.


Each of these approaches leverages different quantum properties and could form the basis of quantum networks with unique security and functionality advantages.

 

There is an affordable, industrially hardened, impenetrable true quantum network developed by us available to secure the critical infrastructure. To learn more, please contact us.